

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 307029
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:WBRUBECK:HE
APPROVED BY INR HNSAUNDERS
S/S - FWISNER

-----008176 240249Z /73

O 240213Z DEC 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 307029

NODIS
CHEROKEE FOR USDEL CAIRO NO 16

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR JO IS EG XF

SUBJECT: HUSSEIN ROLE IN WEST BANK/GAZA DIALOGUE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

REF: A) AMMAN 9575; B) STATE

1. REFTELS REFLECT THE NEED FOR US TO DO SOME THINKING
ABOUT WHETHER AND HOW HUSSEIN MIGHT TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE
IN THE WEST BANK/GAZA DIALOGUE AT SOME POINT FOLLOWING THE
DECEMBER 25 SADAT-BEGIN MEETING SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES WAR-
RANT. AT THIS STAGE, WE HAVE NO FIRM VIEWS AND ARE SIMPLY
ASKING FOR YOUR PERSONAL THOUGHTS.

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2. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS NEED CONSIDERATION. SOME OF THEM
INCLUDE:

-- WILL THE ISRAELIS BE RELUCTANT TO OPEN AN EXCHANGE IN
THE NEAR FUTURE THAT IMPLIES A STAKE FOR HUSSEIN IN THE
WEST BANK SETTLEMENT?

-- WOULD HUSSEIN'S INVOLVEMENT FORCE THE ISRAELIS TO FOCUS MORE CLEARLY ON WHAT ROLE THEY ENVISAGE FOR JORDAN IN A WEST BANK SETTLEMENT?

-- WOULD SADAT FEEL THAT INVOLVING HUSSEIN WITH ISRAELIS COMPLICATES UNDULY HIS OWN STRATEGY? FOR INSTANCE, WOULD SADAT PREFER TO RETAIN FREEDOM TO MAKE HIS OWN JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT KIND OF ISRAELI DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WOULD BE REQUIRED?

-- WHAT MIGHT WE DO TO ENCOURAGE MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATION BETWEEN SADAT AND HUSSEIN AND WHAT ADVERSE REACTIONS MIGHT THE EFFORT PRODUCE?

-- HOW MIGHT THE ISRAELIS REACT TO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM US TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH HUSSEIN?

-- HOW MIGHT WE BEST APPROACH THE ISRAELIS?

-- SHOULD WE TRY THIS OUT ON HUSSEIN AND/OR SADAT BEFORE APPROACHING THE ISRAELIS?

-- WHAT RISKS DO WE (AND HUSSEIN) RUN, PARTICULARLY WITH SYRIANS, IN THE LIKELY EVENT THERE ARE LEAKS ABOUT SUCH A THREE-WAY CONVERSATION (AND OUR INVOLVEMENT) EVEN IF IT IS KEPT IN DISCREET CHANNELS? WHAT SERIOUS PRESSURES
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CAN SYRIANS IMPOSE ON HUSSEIN AS REACTION TO HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

-- WHAT MERITS/DEMERITS DO YOU SEE IN OUR PROPOSING SUCH A THREE-WAY DIALOGUE AS A HALFWAY HOUSE TO HUSSEIN'S OPEN PARTICIPATION IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS?

3. AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND EILTS MIGHT BE ALERT IN DEBRIEFINGS ON BEGIN-SADAT MEETING TO WHATEVER THOUGHTS MAY HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED ON INVOLVING HUSSEIN. THAT WILL BE A KEY REFERENCE POINT IN ANY DECISION HERE TO ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN'S INVOLVEMENT. WE WILL, IN ANY EVENT, OWE HUSSEIN A FURTHER RESPONSE TO HIS OWN QUESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT (REFTELS). WITH THESE CONCERNS IN MIND, I WOULD APPRECIATE THE COMMENTS OF ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY AFTER REPORTS ON BEGIN-SADAT MEETING ARE IN HAND, IN ORDER TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE FURTHER HERE. APART FROM WHATEVER EILTS AND LEWIS MAY HEAR, AT THE PRESENT STAGE THIS EXERCISE IS INTENDED SOLELY AS AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION AMONG OURSELVES. VANCE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 307029

NODIS

CHEROKEE - ONLY FOR DR BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 307029 ACTION TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS
DEC 24.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 307029

NODIS

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: WBRUBECK:HE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Litigation History:
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Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
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Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 77 AMMAN 9575, 78 AMMAN 9575, 78 STATE 9
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 131278
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HUSSEIN ROLE IN WEST BANK/GAZA DIALOGUE
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, PGOV, JO, IS, EG, XF, (HUSSEIN I)
To: TEL AVIV AMMAN MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a16b0efd-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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Margaret P. Grafeld
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22 May 2009
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